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GUEST STATUTES: HAVE RECENT CASES BROUGHT THEM
TO THE END OF THE ROAD?
I. The Problem
Legal scholars, judges, and practitioners have spent an inordinate amount
of time discussing and attempting to avoid the quagmires one can fall into while
litigating guest statute cases. Recent cases, however, have made an effort to

clarify this "tangle of confusion." 1 The purpose of this article is not to present
a catalog of information on guest statutes; that has been done with sufficient
thoroughness in other works.2 Rather, this article is an attempt to briefly point
out typical problems of guest statutes, to critically evaluate the solution sought
by recent decisions, and to review the future of guest statutes.
California's guest statute, similar in most respects to other states', provides:
No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by
another person with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a
ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such
a ride, nor any other person, has any right of action for civil damages
against the driver of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable
for the conduct of the driver on account of personal injury to or the death
of the owner or guest during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action
establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.3
Definitional problems in such a statute are abundant. First, "guest" must
be defined. A guest is ordinarily one who accepts a gratuitous ride. Still, in some
states the least amount of pecuniary benefit conferred on the host by the guest
may change the guest's status to that of a "passenger for hire." 4 If one is indeed
a "gratuitous" guest, there are still further problems. For example, can an owner
be placed in the unusual position of being a guest in his own car?' Can an infant s or a family member of the host' be defined as a guest? What if the accident
occurs in a private drive?' What if the guest is entering the car? What if the
1 W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 382 (4th ed. 1971).
2 See, e.g., 8 Ams. JUR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 465-523 '(1963); 60A
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 399.1-404 (1969); W. PROSSER, supra note 1. at 186-87, 382-85.
3 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1959); For a listing of guest statutes see Note,
Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 884, 899-901 (1968).
4 See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399.10 (1969); 8 AM. JuR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 475 (1963); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases- Lots of Them (The California Guest Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1968); Note, The Liability of An Automobile
Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger, 20 VA. L. REV. 326 (1933); Kelly, Compensation and the
California Guest Statute: Updating the Tangible Benefit and Motivation Tests, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 1233 (1971).

5

Patton v. La Bree, 60 Cal. 2d 606, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622, 387 P.2d 398 (1963); 60A C.J.S.

Motor Vehicles § 399.10 (1969).
6 8 Am. JuR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 483 (1963). See also Note, Recovery by Child Under Iowa Guest Statute, 41 IOWA L. Rv. 648 (1956); Note, Torts: The
Guest Statute and Infants of Tender Years, 11 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 124 (1958); Note, The Need
for Clarification: Should a Child Under the Age of Seven be Included Within the Provisions
of Automobile Guest Statutes?, 75 DicK. L. REV. 432 (1971).
7 8 Am. JUR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 482 (1963).

8

O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 59 Cal. Rptr. 840, 429 P.2d 160 (1967); 8

AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 474 (1963).
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car has come to a momentary halt? The answers to these questions may play a
crucial role in a guest statute case.
The dilemma of determining the minimum degree of fault for liability under
a guest statute must also be treated. What does "gross negligence," "willful misconduct," or "intoxication" mean? American Jurisprudence (Second) somewhat understates the problem when it says that none of these terms are susceptible of exact definition.9 Additionally, can contributory negligence be a defense
to willful misconduct, or must the defense be based on contributory willful misconduct?"0 Assumption of the risk by the guest, the possible duty of a guest to
watch for and warn of danger, or the possible duty of a guest to protest the
driver's conduct can all present additional pitfalls which can be determinative
of a case.1 '
The complex problems seem endless. Courts, in construing the statutes,
have often attempted to avoid harsh results. Such construction, however, has
resulted in myriad exceptions and peculiar quirks in an already troublesome
statute. One writer, referring to the Florida guest statute, describes such an
anomaly:
[I]f a person gets into an automobile without the driver's permission and
an accident occurs, the wrongdoer may recover damages from the negligent
driver, even if the driver has previously ordered the trespasser not to board
the vehicle. It is only when the trespasser's presence is unknown that liability
is limited to instances of wanton and willful misconduct. In other words,
a known invited guest has less protection than a known trespasser!2

Definitions further operate to create exceptions and "every exception carved out
of a statute weakens its effectiveness and destroys its vitality."' 3
Guest statutes place a heavy financial burden on those who are least protected and most often innocent of any blame. The negligent host, on the other
hand, is protected by the statute. The principal cases, discussed infra, realize
this distortion of justice and establish a more realistic basis of liability for the
host.
II. The California Decision
In a recent decision the California Supreme Court declared its guest statute
unconstitutional. 4 In Brown v. Merlo the court nullified the California guest
statute by holding that it violated the equal protection clauses of the California 5
and United States' 6 Constitutions. Before analyzing the California decision,
9

8 Am. JuR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 486 (1963).

10 Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. 2d 579, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505 (1968); 8 Am.
JuR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 524 (1963).
11 See 8 Am. JUR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 524-48 (1963); Pedrick,
Taken For a Ride: The Automobile Guest Statute and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. Ruv.

90 (1961).
12 Tipton, Florida'sAutomobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 287, 309 (1958).
13 Note, The "Minors of Tender Years" Exception Now Court-Made Law in Illinois, 20
DE PAUL L. REv. 559, 573 (1970).
14 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973).
15 CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 21.
16 U.S. Co NsT. amend. XIV.
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it would be helpful to briefly note three significant cases which have upheld the
constitutionality of guest statutes.
A. Past Decisions
An analysis of the constitutionality of guest statutes begins with Silver v.
Silvery an early decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. The case
has been cited by many courts as upholding the constitutionality of guest statutes
in general; however, the challenge to the Connecticut guest statute in Silver was
limited. The argument was that the classification of the guests in automobiles as
distinguished from those in other vehicles was arbitrary. The United States
Supreme Court, affirming the Connecticut Supreme Court, stated:
It is said that the vice in the statute is not that it distinguishes between
passengers who pay and those who do not, but between gratuitous passengers
in automobiles and those in other classes of vehicles. But it is not so evident
that the
that no grounds exist for the distinction that we can say a priori
8
classification is one forbidden as without basis and arbitrary.'
The court additionally observed that automobile litigation was increasing and
that limiting multiplicity of suits was a legitimate legislative function. 9
Another case frequently cited as upholding the constitutionality of guest
statutes is Naudzius v. Lahr.20 In Naudzius it was contended that the Michigan
legislature, by abolishing "the right of an action for ordinary negligence, deprive[d] plaintiff of a right of property without due process of law."'" It was
further argued that the act established "unreasonable, arbitrary, and unlawful
classes of persons" by distinguishing between guests in motorcars and guests in
other vehicles and between gratuitous and paying passengers in the same situation. " Naudzius articulated the underlying purposes of the Michigan statute.
These purposes have been almost universally accepted. The first purpose was to
prevent collusion between the host and guest against an insurance company;2"
the second was to prevent recovery by an ungrateful guest.24 The court upheld
the discrimination based on the two purposes finding the classification had its
basis in reason. It analogized the discriminating treatment to similar distinctions
in other areas such as between the bailee and the bailor, the common carrier and
the ordinary driver, and the innkeeper and the social host. "5
Another case dealing with the constitutionality of guest statutes is Shea v.
Olson. 6 It was contended the statute there violated guarantees of equal protection, due process, and trial by jury. In holding the statute valid, the Washington
17
18

280 U.S. 117 (1929).
Id. at 123.

19 Id. at 122-23.

20 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931).
21 Id. at 221, 234 N.W. at 583.
22 Id. at 222, 234 N.W. at 583.
23 Id. at 224, 234 N.W. at 584.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 226-27, 234 N.W. at 584.
26 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
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Supreme Court relied on the purposes enunciated in Naudzius. The court explained:
It has been asserted that collusion frequently takes place between the host
and guest to establish a case of gross negligence against the host, in order
to fasten liability upon a company by whom the host is insured; that, be
cause of a friendly regard for the guest, and knowing that he himself will
not have to pay the bill anyway, the host is willing to admit, and often testify
to, a state of facts other than it actually is, and thus deprive the insurance
company of the benefit of a good defense. 27
The court also emphasized the second purpose of the guest statute, i.e., preventing inhospitality. If a guest were allowed to recover, drivers would be deterred
from extending favors for fear of being compelled to defend a suit.28 The Washington court concluded:
The only limitation upon the legislature in the exercise of [the police] power
is that the act must reasonably tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state and not violate any positive mandate of the constitution.
The act, in our opinion, fully meets the requirements of the constitution 9
The die was thus cast. Guest statutes were found necessary to protect hospitality and prevent collusion. As such they were a valid exercise of police power.
Throughout their existence, however, guest statutes have done a great deal more
than promote the purposes for which they were enacted, if they do indeed promote those purposes. They have also eliminated many claims by innocent victims with sometimes disastrous injuries.
B. Equal Protection Test
The California Supreme Court, in a well-reasoned opinion, held the two
justifications traditionally given for guest statutes fail to provide a rational basis
for the differential treatment actually accorded by the statute's classification."
The court's opinion, written by Judge Tobriner, tested the constitutionality of
the statute by examining the traditional justifications in light of the recent tests
of equal protection.
The court applied the "rationality" standard for equal protection as delineated by recent United States Supreme Court cases and recent California decisions. 1 Reed v. Reed enunciated this standard as follows:
The Equal Protection Clause .

.

. den[ies] to States the power to legislate

that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
27 Id. at 155, 53 P.2d at 620.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 161, 53 P.2d at 622.
30 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 859, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 390-91, 506 P.2d 212, 214-15
(1973).
31 The court dismissed, in a footnote, the plaintiffs argument that the "strict scrutiny"
standard should be applied. 8 Cal. 3d at 861 n.2, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392 n.2, 506 P.2d at
216 n.2.
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that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike." [Quoting from Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)1.2
C. Protection of Hospitality
The court found two main reasons why protection of hospitality did not
provide a rational basis for discrimination. First, there is no justification for
treating the guests in automobiles differently than all other recipients of hospitality 3 The case of Rowland v. Christian,4 for example, held that hosts must
exercise reasonable care not to injure a social guest. As the court noted in Brown,
it was decided in the 1930's that:
when a landowner undertook any "active operation" he bore a duty to
exercise due care towards trespassers, licensees and invitees alike ....

The

operation of an automobile, of course, constituted the paradigm case of an
"active operation" which would bring the ordinary due care standard into
play.... Thus, for more than three decades California's guest statute has
singled out automobile guests
for harsher treatment and less protection than
5
guests receive generally.
The court had additional support for its holding. Citing decisions doing
away with charitable immunities, Judge Tobriner reasoned that however laudable "the motives of a hospitable host or however generous his charity, it is irrational to reward that generosity by subjecting beneficiaries to a greater risk of uncompensated injury than is faced by other individuals." 8 Under this principle,
the guest statute's classification scheme was found to be clearly unreasonable. In
summary, the opinion concluded:
[I]t is irrational to assume that if a recipient of generosity is permitted recovery for negligent injuries, the cause of "ingratitude" will be served or
the cause of "hospitality" plundered. Thus, we conclude that by depriving
automobile guests of a right of action for negligence which is afforded to
all other passengers or pedestrians, the California guest statute draws an
irrational3 7 classification condemned by both our federal and state constitutions.

D. Prevention of Collusion
Having successfully destroyed the hospitality rationale, the court continued:
[T]he constitutionality of the guest statute must stand or fall on whether
the provision's classification scheme bears a substantial and rational relation
32
33
34
35
36
37

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
8 Cal. 3d at 864, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394, 506 P.2d at 218.
69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
8 Cal. 3d at 865 n.6, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.6, 506 P.2d at 219 n.6.
Id. at 871, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 506 P.2d at 223.
Id. at 872, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400, 506 P.2d at 224.
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to the second proposed objective of the statute: the preclusion of collusive
lawsuits against insurance companies."8
The statute, to prevent collusion, required a showing that the host was
guilty of willful misconduct or intoxication. However, the court found the classification of "guest" to be overly broad, 9 reasoning that there is no more reason
to suspect collusion between host and guest, than between host and paying rider.
In the same manner, if the guest and host could collude on the issue of negligence
without such a statute, what should prevent them from colluding on the issue of
compensation (in order to fit within the "passenger for hire" exception) with
such a statute?40
The court drew on an analogous holding denying the invocation of the
doctrine of family immunity. 1 Members of a family are not precluded from
suit merely because of a possibility of collusion. In like fashion, the court in
Brown reasoned: "it is unreasonable to eliminate causes of action of an entire
class of persons simply because some undefined portion of the designated class
may file fraudulent lawsuits."" 2 In any event, collusive suits seem more likely
with family members as opposed to host and guest in an automobile. Since
members of a family can now sue other members of the same family, there is
no compelling reason why a guest cannot recover from his automobile host.
The court pointed out an additional problem with the statute by supplying
numerous examples of recovery by happenstance. The court described the problem as arising from statutory loopholes which "add yet another element of irrationality to the provision's classification scheme, for they, too, are totally unrelated
to either the 'hospitality' or 'anti-collusion' theme." 3 The court explained as
follows:
The numerous statutory exceptions in the guest statute-making a guest's

recovery turn on the mobility or immobility of the vehicle, the physical location of the guest in or outside the car or the physical location of the vehicle
on a pivate or public 44highway-similarly bear "no discernible relationship
to the realities of life."
Thus, Brown demonstrated that the classification of guests had no relevance
to the purpose of preventing inhospitality or the purpose of ending collusive
suits. California, however, is not likely to be the only state to so decide, for other
states may well rely on Brown and its forceful arguments for striking down similar
statutes.

38 Id. at 872-73, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400, 506 P.2d at 224.
39 "Overinclusive categories are unconstitutional because they fly squarely in the face of
our traditional antipathy to assertions of mass guilt and guilt by association." Tussman and
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341. 352 (1949).
40 8 Cal. 3d at 875, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03, 506 P.2d at 226-27.
41 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692,
26 Cal. Rptr. 102. 376 P.2d 70 (1962).
42 8 Cal. 3d at 875, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 402, 506 P.2d at 226.
43 Id. at 878, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 405, 506 P.2d at 229.
44 Id. at 882, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407, 506 P.2d at 231.
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III. Subsequent Cases
As of this writing, at least two trial court rulings have cited Brown in declarmng state guest statutes unconstitutional; and both cases indicate a trend toward
strong acceptance of the Brown rationale and reasoning.
The case of Putney u. Piper involved a suit against a host by a minor child.
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, the defendant contended the Iowa guest statute,4" which required a
showing of intoxication by alcohol or other drugs, or reckless driving, prohibited
plaintiff's recovery. In answer to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
contended the Iowa statute was unconstitutional as per Brown. In denying
defendant's motion, Judge Oxberger stated:
There is reason to believe that guest statute legislation, of which Iowa's
statute is a prototype, is unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court
has this year struck down that state's guest statute for being violative of the
equal protection
guarantees of the California and United States Con47
stitutions.
The court followed closely the organization and reasoning of the California decision, relying on it throughout the ruling. It applied the rationale of the California decision to the Iowa statute and concluded:
[T]he classifications which the Iowa guest statute establishes in determining
which categories of passengers are permitted and which are denied recovery
for negligently inflicted injuries from the owner or operation of a motor
vehicle are lacking in a reasonable or substantial relationship to the purposes
of such legislation and for that reason render the statute unconstitutional
as a violation of the equal protection guarantees of both the Iowa and the
United States Constitutions.4"
The Putney decision, although from a trial court, has demonstrable importance. It appears that the Brown decision may provide the impetus for other
states to act on their statutes.
Another recent case adopting the rationale of Brown is Fox v. Knapp.9
This case was a trial court ruling on defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Defendant argued the Indiana guest statute prohibited the suit. The decision
on the ruling merely stated that the Indiana guest statute was in "violation of
the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, and
of the Constitution of the United States."5 The plaintiff's brief relied heavily
upon the Brown decision, and the case undoubtedly played a major role in the
court's determination. The argument was stated as follows:
The issue of the constitutionality of the California Guest Statute, which is
substantially similar to the Indiana Statute, was recently before the California Supreme Court in the case of Brown v. Merlo. [Citation omitted.] In
45
46
47
48
49
50

Law No. 2798 '(Dist. Ct., Polk County, Iowa, August, 1973).
IowA CODE ANN. § 321.494 (Gum. Pamphlet 1973).
Putney v. Piper, Law No. 2798 (Dist. Ct., Polk County, Iowa, August, 1973), at 6.
Id. at 13.
Cause No. 33-581 '(Cir. Ct., Pulaski County, Ind., August 9, 1973).
Id.
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a unanimous decision which is as admirable as it was overdue, the Court
declared the California Guest Statute unconstitutional as a violation of the
equal protection guarantees of the California and United States Constitutions. Because of the persuasiveness and the inherent soundness of that
decision, it is probable that it will sweep the country.51
The brief contends further that the Supreme Court of Indiana is probably willing
to rid Indiana law of one of the few remaining pockets of protected negligence
which is provided by the Indiana guest statute since the state has recently abrogated governmental, interspousal, and charitable immunities.52
Although Fox and Putney are trial court rulings, it is apparent courts are
willing to re-examine traditional arguments sustaining the validity of guest statutes. There is no doubt that more trial courts and courts of last resort will consider the Brown rationale. The time is ripe for a plaintiff's attorney in an automobile litigation action to seize upon the opportunity for re-analysis of the guest
statutes. Although other arguments may suggest themselves, the equal protection
argument should be stressed. Courts have shown their willingness to accept it,
and it embodies sound reasoning.
IV. Conclusion
By articulate and concise reasoning, Brown v. Merlo declared California's
guest statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the equal protection
clause of both the California and United States Constitutions. The case removed
the onerous burden of proving willful misconduct from the plaintiff and gave him
a more just possibility of recovery.
Using identical reasoning, several lower courts have followed suit in striking
down state guest statutes. The fact that these cases were from trial courts is significant: the inclination of lower courts to strike down such legislation on the trial
level is indicative of the unpopularity of guest statutes and indicates a confidence
that such rulings will be upheld on appeal. This willingness and confidence on
the part of trial courts should definitely be taken advantage of by plaintiffs'
counsel.
But more than plaintiffs and prospective plaintiffs will benefit from these
decisions. The judiciary itself stands as one beneficiary. Although the number
of negligence actions may increase slightly, courts will no longer have to deal
with knotty legal problems which are inherent in guest statute cases; 5" the time
and inconvenience saved on this matter alone are significant.
Moreover, for all of us, the Brown decision and its progeny raise a spark of
hope for compensation in the event of a negligently inflicted injury on a so-called
guest. Some solace should be found in the fact that the host, whose "friendly"
hand could once negligently crack his guest's skull"' with little fear of liability,
will now be compelled by progressive courts to reach into his pocketbook to compensate such injuries.
Peter A. R. Lardy
51
Ind.,
52
53
54

Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Fox v. Knapp, Cause No. 33-581 (Cir. Ct., Pulaski County,
August 9, 1973).
Id.
W. PRossER, supra note 1, at 187.
Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 370, 94 N.W.2d 858, 862 (1959).

